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Abstract
In this paper I calibrate the contribution of R&D investments to productivity growth.
The basis for the analysis is the free entry condition. This yields a relationship between the
resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology. Since innovators are small, this
relationship is not directly aﬀected by the size of the R&D externalities, the presence of scale
eﬀects or diminishing returns in R&D after controlling for the growth rate of output and the
interest rate. The resulting contribution of R&D to productivity growth in the US is smaller
than three to five tenths of one percentage point. Interestingly, this constitutes an upper
bound for the case where innovators internalize the consequences of their R&D investments on
the cost of conducting future innovations. From a normative perepective, this analysis implies
that, if the innovation technology takes the form assumed in the literature, the actual US R&D
intensity may be the socially optimal.
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1 Introduction
What is the contribution of R&D to the growth of advanced economies? Is it the main factor or
does it play just a minor role?
This question has been answered by computing the social return to R&D in a simple econometric
framework. Typically, the endogenous variable is the Solow residual and the explanatory variables
are the firm’s or industry’s own R&D intensity and the used R&D from other firms or industries.
The estimated return to own R&D ranges from .2 to .5, while for the used R&D the estimate ranges
from .4 to .8 with a total social return to R&D of about 70 to 100 percent.1 These numbers are
very large. Indeed, they imply that the Solow residual is fully accounted by R&D alone.
Before reaching this conclusion, we should have in mind an important caveat to this econometric
approach. Namely, that there are many factors omitted in the typical regression that aﬀect simulta-
neously TFP growth and the parties incentives to invest in R&D. The most obvious candidates are
anything that enhances disembodied productivity, like the managerial and organizational practices,
learning by doing,... All these elements have a clear eﬀect on TFP and at the same time induce
firms to invest in R&D. Some evidence in favor of the potential importance of this bias comes from
the fact that, after including fixed eﬀects in the regression, the eﬀect of R&D on TFP growth almost
disappears (Jones and Williams [1998]).
To overcome this omitted variable bias, I depart from the econometric framework. Instead, I
use a model with endogenous development of new technologies to assess the importance of R&D
for growth. From a methodological point of view, I do not attempt to calibrate directly the social
return to R&D to figure out its role on growth. My route is more indirect because it decomposes
the problem into two parts. First, I compute the eﬀect of the amount of resources devoted to R&D
on the output of the R&D sector (that is the growth rate of R&D driven technologies). Then, I
use simple growth accounting to compute the eﬀect of the growth of technology on productivity
growth.
One possible way to establish the first relationship ( i.e. between the resources devoted to R&D
and the growth rate of technology) is to calibrate the production function of technology. Note that
this approach entails probably even more challenges than the traditional productivity approach
because in addition to measuring the externalities involved in R&D, we have to specify an R&D
production function. I discuss this further below in the context of a specific empirical test.
1See Griliches [1992], Jones and Williams [1998] and Nadiri [1992] for references.
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The approach I propose in this paper, instead, uses the no arbitrage condition that implies
that in equilibrium no innovator is willing to invest more in R&D. This means that the eﬀect
of the share of resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology is proportional to
the inverse of the market value of innovations. The advantage of using a free entry condition as
opposed to the production function is that, since innovators are small, they don’t take into account
the eﬀect of their investment decisions on the aggregate variables when computing the value of an
innovation. Therefore, I can use these observable aggregate variables to establish the eﬀect of the
R&D investments on the growth rate of technology without having to take any stand on the size of
the R&D spillovers.
The results I obtain are quite striking given the existing consensus about the importance of
R&D for growth.2 The average annual growth rate of productivity in the US during the post-war
period has been 2.2 percentage points. Less than 3 to 5 tenths of 1 percentage point are due to
R&D.
The intuition for this small contribution is quite simple. The few resources devoted to R&D
(about 2 percent of GDP) clearly signal a small private value of the innovations. But, as the
bulk of the productivity literature has argued, there may be significant externalities that lead to
large productivity gains even with few R&D investments. These externalities can appear in the
production of final output or in the R&D process.
Production externalities arise because the improvement of technology has an eﬀect on labor
productivity beyond its contribution to the quality adjusted capital stock (i.e. it aﬀects the Solow
residual). Innovators can only appropriate the value of their innovation to the extent that it enhances
the quality adjusted capital stock. Since innovations are embodied in capital goods, innovations
with higher (social) value will be more demanded. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the market value of the
innovations will be correlated with their social value. In terms of my two-step approach, this means
that a large production externality raises the eﬀect of the growth of technology on productivity
growth but reduces the growth of technology associated with a given R&D intensity. As a result,
the R&D contribution to productivity growth is not very sensitive to the size of the externalities in
production.
2The only exception to this consensus is the BLS who reports a R&D contribution to Total factor productivity
growth of 0.2 percentage points. The diﬀerence in the BLS estimates arises primarily from two sources. First, the
BLS does not include federally-funded research in the measure of R&D. This is an important omission because from
1953 to 1994, the average share of the nondefense federally funded R&D in total nondefense R&D was 35 percent).
Second, the BLS assumes a depreciation rate of 8.8 percent on R&D capital.
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R&D externalities associate past R&D investments with a reduction in the cost of developing
future innovations. To show the inconsistency of large R&D externalities and a low R&D intensity
in steady state, suppose for a moment that the R&D externalities were large and that the economy is
in steady state. Then, a small R&D intensity today, can generate a large growth rate of technology
that in turn generate a large reduction in the costs of developing innovations tomorrow. As a result,
tomorrow, agents want to devote a large share of resources into R&D; but this is inconsistent with
the fact that the share of resources devoted to R&D is constant in steady state. Therefore, the
observed low R&D intensity indicates that R&D externalities cannot be very large.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches the basic argument. In section
3, I conduct the baseline calibration based on the model presented in Jones and Williams [2000].
This model is quite general and can accommodate idea-based models both with quality ladders and
increasing variety of intermediate inputs. One clear goal of this paper is to show that the magnitude
of the calibrated R&D contribution to productivity growth is very robust. Section 4 tries to show
this. To accomplish this goal, I investigate elements that aﬀect the relationship between the share
of resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology. I also consider more general
production functions to analyze the eﬀect of technology on productivity growth. In section 4.3, I
move out of the steady state and consider how the calibrations would change had the US economy
been in transition to the steady state. In section 5, I draw the welfare implications of the previous
analysis. Specifically, the free entry condition establishes a relationship between the R&D intensity
and the growth rate of technology that can be used to calibrate the size of the R&D externalities.
Once this is done, we can solve the social planner’s problem. This entails determining how much she
would invest in R&D with the calibrated production structure. Then we can compare this socially
optimal R&D intensity with the actual intensity and draw the appropriate policy prescriptions.
The resulting picture after this journey is that R&D plays an small role in US productivity growth
- definitely much smaller than what we thought- and that the observed R&D intensity may not be
as far as previous work concluded from the socially optimal intensity.
2 The basic argument
Let’s denote by A the level of technology associated with R&D investments. In the terminology
of Romer [1990] or Grossman and Helpman [1991, ch. 3], this is the number of capital varieties
though I will show later that this framework can accommodate other interpretations. To compute
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the R&D contribution to productivity growth, I start by investigating the relationship between the
amount of resources devoted to R&D (expressed in units of final output, which is the numeraire),
R, and the growth rate of technology. Then I use a production function to relate the growth rate
of A to the growth rate of labor productivity. Throughout the paper I use X˙ to designate the time
derivative of variable X, and γX to denote the growth rate of variable X.
Let PA denote the market price of a firm that has earned a patent to produce one of these
varieties. The free entry condition implies that innovators make zero profits in equilibrium, there-
fore the cost incurred to develop the patent (R) is equal to the market value of the flow of new
technologies (PAA˙).
PAA˙ = R. (Free Entry)
The free entry condition can be rewritten as in equation (1), where Y denotes the economy-wide
output, s denotes the share of resources devoted to R&D (i.e. s ≡ R
Y
).
PA γA = s
Y
A
(1)
Successful innovators earn patents that entitle them to charge a markup (η) above the marginal
cost of production. As we shall see, the static operating profits earned by an innovator are
π = η − 1η α
Y
A
. (2)
To close the first step in the argument, we just have to derive the market price of an innovation.
Suppose for simplicity that patents do not expire and that innovators are not taken over by new
innovators with more sophisticated capital goods. Then the value of an innovation, PA, must satisfy
the following asset equation:
rPA = π + P˙A, (3)
where r is the relevant discount factor.
In steady state, all variables grow at constant rates. From equation (1), this implies that
γPA = γY − γA. (4)
Substituting expressions (4), (2) and (1) into equation (3) and isolating γA we obtain the fol-
lowing expression for the growth rate of technology in terms of s :
γA =
r − γY
η−1
η
α
s
− 1
(5)
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There are two important observations from this expression. First, γA in expression (5) does not
depend directly on the size of the externalities in R&D or on the degree of the diminishing returns
to aggregate R&D investments; note that I have not even specified the production function for
technologies. This is the case, because we have mimicked the calculations made by small innovators
that want to figure out the market price of their innovations (PA) and do not take into account
the eﬀect of their investment decisions on aggregate variables like the interest rate or the growth
rate of output. Since the externalities appear through these aggregate variables, we do not need to
calibrate them once we control for γY and r. Second, the quantitative result of the paper comes
from the fact that γA is increasing in s. The link between these two variables does not come from
a production function for technology; it follows from the positive relationship that the free entry
condition (1) defines between the two. Quite crucially for my results, since the observed value of s
is small (approximately 2 percent), γA is also going to be small.
The second step in the computation of the R&D contribution to productivity growth consists
in calibrating the eﬀect of the growth rate of R&D driven technology (γA) on the growth rate of
productivity. For this we need to specify a production function of the form
Y = F (Z,A,K, L)
where Z is the level of disembodied productivity and K and L denote capital and labor respectively.
From here, the contribution of R&D to productivity is·
αA + α
∂K
∂A
¸
γA,
where α is the capital share and αA is the elasticity of Y with respect to A.
It is useful to assign some tentative values to these parameters to make some back to the envelope
calculations about the R&D contribution to productivity growth. A conservative value for η is 1.2, α
is about 1/3, r is around 0.07, γY has been 0.034 in the post-war period, s is approximately 0.02 and
the elasticity of productivity growth with respect to R&D-driven technology growth
¡
i.e. αA + α∂K∂A
¢
is about 0.1. This implies that γA is about 0.02, and
£
αA + α∂K∂A
¤
γA is about two tenths of one
percentage point.
From this analysis, it is quite transparent that my calibration of the size of the R&D contribution
to productivity growth is aﬀected by elements that influence the pricing of an innovation, and the
elasticity of output with respect to technology. As we shall see in section 3, the markup η contains
information about the set of possible values of αA and ∂K∂A .Moreover, in the more general production
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functions studied in section 4.2, I show that there is a trade oﬀ between the eﬀect of γA on the
growth rate of productivity and the eﬀect of s on γA. This trade oﬀ allows me to extend the results
to production functions where the production externality (αA) is larger without altering the R&D
contribution to productivity growth.
The market price of an innovation depends on several variables like the expected life of the
patent, the market structure, how innovative the new capital product is, what is the gestation
lag before the product is commercialized, the cost advantage obtained by the incumbent in the
development of subsequent innovations, etc. In section 4.1, I study all these aspects of the R&D
process and set an upper bound for the R&D contribution to productivity growth.
3 Jones and Williams
The baseline model I calibrate is presented in Jones and Williams [2000]. It is a generalization of
Romer [1990] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, ch.3]. As in these papers, growth comes from
the development of new varieties of intermediate goods. Final output is produced out of labor and
intermediate goods. In particular, I assume the functional form in equation (6). This specification,
introduces a wedge between the capital share and the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent
varieties which is equal to αρ.
Yt = ZtL
1−α
t
Ã
AtX
i=1
xαρit
! 1
ρ
(6)
Standard profit maximization implies the following inverse demand curve for intermediate goods
pit = αL1−αt
Ã
AtX
i=1
xαρit
! 1
ρ−1
xαρ−1it .
As is commonly assumed in the literature of endogenous technological change, successful devel-
opers of intermediate goods are granted infinitely lived patents that allow them to charge a markup
(η) over and above the marginal cost of production (rt).3 The size of this mark up depends on the
specific assumptions made about the degree of substitutability between diﬀerent intermediate goods.
Following Jones and Williams [2000], I introduce the concept of innovation clusters to model the
3The calibrated eﬀect of R&D on growth is independent of the rate of transformation between final output and
intermediate goods. This parameter that here is normalized to 1 just cancels out.
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idea that there is some overlap between new and existing innovations that causes the obsolescence
of the latter. Say, out of every (ψN + ψ) intermediate goods developed, only ψN are completely
new. The rest are just new versions of existing intermediate goods that are necessary to use the new
intermediate good. These new versions are otherwise identical to the existing ones.4 Note that this
mechanism is similar to the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction emphasized by Aghion
and Howitt [1992] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4] and therefore limits the expected
life span of the innovation.
When a new technological cluster is developed, the incumbents try to prevent the diﬀusion of
the new technological cluster by reducing their prices. Two scenarios are possible here. It may
be the case that these reactions do not constrain the pricing decisions of the innovators. Then
the innovator charges the monopolist price p = ηmrt, where ηm = (αρ)−1 . Alternatively, the limit
pricing rule may be binding. Since in reality we observe that new products are developed and
adopted I focus on the equilibrium where new intermediate goods are immediately adopted.5 After
imposing this restriction we can derive the limit pricing rule that is consistent with the adoption of
new varieties. Jones and Williams [2000], show that the markup under limit pricing is
ηL =
µ
ψN
ψ + 1
¶ 1
αρ−1
.
Intuitively, the higher the ratio of the number of new goods to the number of complementary goods
that must be changed to use the new innovation (ψNψ ), the lower is the limit markup because more
incumbents are willing to reduce their prices to prevent adoption. Quite naturally, the limit price
is also decreasing in the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. The resulting price for
intermediate goods is pit = ηrt where the markup is the minimum of ηm and ηL.
η = min



monopolistic markupz}|{
1
αρ ,
limit pricing markupz }| {µ
1 +
ψN
ψ
¶ 1
αρ−1



4A simple example that illustrates this concept is a CD writer. Before the CD writer was developed, we just had
a CD reader and a software for this to work. Now with the CD writer, we must modify the CD reader’s software
to make possible the interaction between the two drives. In this case, ψ = 1 (the software) and ψN = 1 (the CD
writer).
5If this is not the case, there is no reason to undertake R&D investments.
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Given this pricing behavior, the instantaneous profits of an innovator are:
π =
µ
η − 1
η
¶
αY
A
(7)
3.1 R&D technology
The R&D sector uses final output to produce new designs for intermediate goods. The production
of designs considered here captures three interesting elements. First, because of the innovation
clusters defined above, only a fraction ψNψN+ψ
of the designs corresponds to new varieties. Second,
either by randomness or because of patent races, there may be a duplication of R&D eﬀort. This
stepping on toes eﬀect is captured by λ ∈ (0, 1] in equation (8). Finally, there are some spillovers
from past innovators to the current ones. On the one hand, new varieties are easier to develop
because their designs take advantage of the knowledge created by previous researchers (standing
on the shoulders eﬀect). On the other, there may be diminishing technological opportunities that
make harder to develop successive varieties (congestion eﬀect). If the standing on shoulders eﬀects
dominates, φ > 0, otherwise φ < 0. From the point of view of the atomistic researchers, there are
constant returns to the resources devoted to R&D (R). This means that they perceive a marginal
product equal to the average product over all the R&D firms. This is represented by δ˜ in equation
(8).
(ψN + ψ)
ψN
A˙ = δ˜R ≡ δRλAφ (8)
Note that this specification accommodates both deterministic and stochastic technologies for
the production of new varieties. Indeed, equation (8) is isomorphic to a quality ladder model where
δ˜ is interpreted as the probability of being successful and ψN is the size of the step in a quality
ladder model a´ la Aghion and Howitt [1992] and Grossman and Helpman [1991, chapter 4].
Equation (8) can be rewritten as
(ψN + ψ)
ψN
γAA = δ˜sY ≡ δ (sY )
λAφ. (9)
From the R&D technology (9) it follows that the eﬀect of the intensity of R&D investment (s)
on γA depends on the size of intertemporal spillovers in R&D (φ) and on the degree of diminishing
returns in the production of varieties (λ). One way to assess the role of R&D in productivity growth
consists in calibrating the eﬀect of s on γA from (9), and then use the production function (6) to
relate γA and productivity growth. The main problems with this approach are that it is sensitive
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to the particular functional form assumed in (9) and that it is diﬃcult to assess the magnitudes of
λ and φ.6 Therefore, it is convenient to find an alternative route that avoids the calibration of λ
and φ. This shortcut comes from the free entry condition.
3.2 Free entry
If innovators are large, they internalize the intertemporal eﬀects of their current R&D investments
and the aggregate (static) diminishing returns to R&D. When innovators are small, they take as
given the cost of developing a new product and neglect any externality from their investment. In
this scenario, free entry brings down the value of innovations to the up front cost of development.
Let’s denote by PA the market value of an innovation. Then, the equilibrium level of resources
devoted to R&D is given by equation (10).
PA
ψN + ψ
ψN
A˙ = R (10)
Since innovations are priced in the market, PA must satisfy an asset equation. This means that
any diﬀerence between the opportunity cost of an innovation and the sum of its profit flow plus the
capital gain must be arbitraged away. More formally,
opportunity costz}|{
rPA =
profit flowz}|{π +
capital gainz }| {
P˙A −
ψ
ψN
γAPA (11)
r =
π
PA
+ γPA −
ψ
ψN
γA
where r is the interest rate faced by innovators, P˙A is the increase in the market value of the design
and ψψN
γA is the expected loss from being replaced by another innovator.
Equation (10) can be rewritten as:
PA =
sψN
γA (ψN + ψ)
Y
A
(12)
Using equations (7) and (12) we solve for the profit rate, and from equation (12), we can derive an
expression for the growth rate of PA in steady state.
π
PA
=
³
η−1
η
´
α (ψN + ψ) γA
s ψN
6This is precisely one of the main problems with the econometric attempts to compute the social return to R&D.
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γPA = γY − γA
Plugging this back into (11) we can solve for the growth rate of varieties (γA).
r =
profit ratez }| {³
η−1
η
´
α (ψN + ψ)
s ψN
γA +
capital gain ratez }| {
γY − (1 +
ψ
ψN
)γA (13)
γA =
r − γYµ
( η−1η )α
s
− 1
¶³
1 + ψψN
´ (14)
Now we can easily solve for the growth rate of productivity and use this expression to figure out
the contribution of R&D to productivity growth. From the production function,
γY/L ≡ γY − γL = γZ +
1
ργA + α (γx − γL) (15)
To solve for γx, I take advantage of the symmetry of the intermediate goods in production. From
the pricing rule and the inverse demand function, it follows then that
xi = L
Ã
αZA
1−ρ
ρ
ηr
! 1
1−α
.
In steady state r is constant and therefore γx − γL = 1−ρρ(1−α)γA. Plugging this back into (15), we
obtain the following expression for the growth rate of productivity:
γY/L =
1
1− αγZ +
Contribution of R&D to productivity growthz }| {
1
ρ
µ
1− αρ
1− α
¶
γA (16)
Before calibrating the R&D contribution to productivity growth it is worthwhile making a few
remarks. The specification of the production function for new technologies does not aﬀect the
calibration of the role of R&D on productivity growth. In particular, the size of the intertemporal
externalities, φ, and the returns to scale in the production of varieties, λ, do aﬀect the relationship
between s and γA after controlling for r and γY . This is the case because the agents are small and
do not internalize the eﬀect of their investment decisions on these aggregate variables. However,
expression (13) restricts the values of φ and λ. To see this, note that in steady state, equation (9)
implies that
γA =
λ
1− φγY .
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Therefore, a low γA implies that neither λ nor φ cannot be very large. In section 5, I take advantage
of this observation to compute the socially optimal R&D intensity and explore whether there is room
for a more active R&D policy.
If φ = 1, 7 this economy displays scale eﬀects (i.e. the growth rate of output per capita is
increasing in the size of the economy). Again, this is something that small innovators do not
incorporate in their investing decisions, therefore the presence or not of scale eﬀects does not aﬀect
the calibration results.
Note also that, since the baseline model is isomorphic to a quality ladder model, the R&D
contribution to productivity growth that I compute next is independent on the actual structure of
the R&D processes.
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
To assess the role of R&D in productivity growth we must calibrate seven parameters.
Table 1: Parameters
r 0.07
γY 0.034
α 0.33
s 0.02
η [1.1, 1.5]
r is calibrated to the average real stock return in the US post-war period from Mehra and
Prescott [1985].8 Pakes and Schankerman [1984] provide evidence that this is approximately the
private rate of return to R&D once we take into account the obsolescence of patents and the gestation
lags that I incorporate in the next section. The average real growth rate of output (γY ) between
1950 and 1999 in the US reported by the BLS is 0.034. The capital share (α) is calibrated to 1
3
.
The markup (η) is calibrated with values in the interval [1.2, 1.5] that lies in the intervals given by
Basu [1996] and Norrbin [1993] for the average markup in the economy. The lower values of this
interval are slightly higher than the lower bound in Basu [1996] and Norrbin [1993] because I want
7This is completely ruled out both by the previous comment and by the existence of a steady state.
8The average real return in corporate bonds with Baa rating since 1976 is 0.066.
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to calibrate the markup charged by an innovator. This is probably higher than the average markup
in the economy because of the monopolistic power conferred by the patent system and because the
higher ratio of the up front fix cost to the marginal cost of production for technological goods than
for non-technological goods or services.
R&D is comprised of basic research, applied research, and development. Raw data on R&D
expenditures derive from four NSF/SRS surveys: Research and Development in Industry, Academic
Research and Development Expenditures, Federal Funds for Research and Development, and Survey
of R&D Funding & Performance by Nonprofit Organizations. Funds used for R&D refer to current
operating costs. These costs consist of both direct and indirect costs. They include not only
salaries, but also fringe benefits, materials, supplies, and overhead. The R&D costs also include the
depreciation of the capital stock employed in R&D activities. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the
share of US non-defense R&D expenditures in the US GDP. In my calibrations, I use a value for
s of 0.02, which is an upper bound for the average share of resources devoted to non-defense R&D
during the post-war period in the US.9
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Figure 1: US share of non-defense R&D expenditures in GDP in percentage points. Source: NSF.
I do not attempt to calibrate ψψN
, though this can be done by using data on the average life span
of a patent or, when more sophisticated concepts of firms are introduced, on the average life span
of a firm or on the average number of patents held by an innovator. To calibrate ρ, I exploit the
relationship between these variables and the markup. There are two cases depending on whether
9In the next section I consider the possibility of international spillovers and then I take into account that some of
the R&D resources invested in other countries may generate growth in the US.
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the innovator can charge the monopolistic markup or whether she is forced to use the limit pricing
rule.
Case 1: If η = 1αρ then
1
ρ = ηα. Figure 2 plots the contribution of R&D to productivity growth
for diﬀerent values of η and ψψN .
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
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7
x 10-3
Psi/PsiN
eta=1.1 
eta=1.2 
eta=1.3 
eta=1.4 
eta=1.5 
Figure 2: Contribution of R&D to productivity growth, monopolistic pricing.
In the figure we can see that under monopolistic pricing the contribution of R&D to growth is
smaller than two tenths of one percentage point for the reasonable markups.10
Case 2: If η =
³
1 + ψNψ
´ 1
ρα−1
then
ρ =

α

1 + ln(η)
ln
³
1 + ψNψ
´




−1
(17)
10For smaller markups like η = 1.1, the contribution of R&D to productivity growth is bounded above by seven
tenths of a percentage point.
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Figure 3: ρ(ψ/ψN |η)
Figure 3, plots the relationship between ρ and ψ/ψN implied by the limit pricing rule for several
values of η. Figure 4, plots the contribution of R&D to productivity growth as a function of ψ/ψN
under limit pricing for diﬀerent markups.
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Figure 4: R&D contribution to productivity growth under limit pricing.
In this case, the upper bound of the contribution of R&D to productivity growth is one tenth of a
15
percentage point for the more reasonable markups.11 This necessarily implies that the externalities
in the R&D process are not as large as the productivity literature has estimated. Note that this
is something that one could start wondering even before starting the calibration exercise, just by
looking at the small fraction of resources devoted to R&D. In the presence of externalities, current
innovators can aﬀect future’s innovators incentives to undertake R&D. If these are very large, future
R&D investments should be very large. But, in steady state, the share of R&D investments in GDP
is constant, therefore the current R&D share in GDP should also be large in the presence of very
significant externalities.
Before enriching the basic model to incorporate other important aspects of the R&D process
and more general production functions, it is interesting to assess the robustness of the computed
R&D contribution to productivity to the calibration of the interest rate (r) and the R&D intensity
(s). For this I calibrate these parameters to levels substantially higher than the ones I consider
most reasonable. In particular, I increase the real interest rate by three additional percentage
points (until ten percent) and the R&D intensity by fifty percent (until three percent of GDP).
Both under monopolistic (figure 5) and limit pricing (figure 6), we can see that the R&D contri-
bution is still quite small for most of the possible values of ψ/ψN and for most of the markups.
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Figure 5: R&D contribution under monopolistic pricing, r = 0.1, s = 0.03.
11For η = 1.1, the upper bound is about three tenths of a percentage point.
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Figure 6: R&D contribution under limit pricing, r = 0.1, s = 0.03.
4 Extensions
Now, I extend the baseline model along several dimensions to show that the size of the R&D
contribution to productivity growth is robust. The first group of extensions deals with considerations
that aﬀect the private value of an innovation. These include the presence of international spillovers
in R&D investments, R&D lags, more drastic obsolescence processes and the possibility of successive
R&D for incumbent firms. The second type of extensions generalizes the production function to
capture more general externalities in the production of final output. Then, I relax the assumption
that the economy is in steady state and compute the R&D contribution to productivity growth if
the US economy had bee in transition during the post-war period.
4.1 The value of innovations
In the free entry condition, equation (12), we can see that the relationship between the share of
resources devoted to R&D and the growth rate of technology is mediated by the value of innovations.
Therefore, a good way to start analyzing the robustness of the results is by enriching the model
with new dimensions of the R&D process that aﬀect the value of innovations.
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4.1.1 International technology flows
Intermediate goods flow internationally. The new technologies developed in Japan can be purchased
in the US and used in the production of final output. This observation has two implications for
the baseline analysis. On the one hand, I should use the R&D investments conducted in the whole
world, and not just in the US, to calibrate the R&D intensity. On the other, a US innovator now
can sell her innovation to the whole world, and therefore I should take into account the eﬀect of this
larger market size on the value of innovations. In terms of our calibration, the first eﬀect implies
that now the free entry condition is
PAw
(ψ + ψN)
ψN
A˙ = Rw, (18)
where Rw represents the R&D in the world. Following the same logic as above, PAw can be expressed
as:
PAw =
ψNsw
(ψ + ψN)γA
Yw
A
, (19)
where Yw and sw denote respectively the world level of output and the share of R&D in the world’s
output.
The second eﬀect implies that the profits of a successful innovator are a function of the output
of the countries where she can sell her innovations. Since innovations can be sold internationally,
the new profit flow from a new variety is:
πw =
µ
η − 1
η
¶
αYw
A
As before, the value of an innovation is determined in the market and must satisfy an asset
equation.
r =
πw
PAw
+ γPAw −
ψ
ψN
γA
The last term on the right hand side is the same as in the closed economy case. In steady state,
equation (19) implies that γPAw is equal to γYw − γA. But the interesting action takes place in
the profit rate. There we can see that the two consequences from the internationalization of the
economy exactly cancel out. More specifically,
πw
PAw
=
³
η−1
η
´
α (ψN + ψ)
sw ψN
γA
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Intuitively, the international flow of intermediate goods raises the resources devoted to develop
the varieties that are ultimately used in the production of US output. The flip side of the coin is
that US’ (and any other country’s) innovators can sell their goods to a larger market. Since both
forces are proportional to Yw, they cancel out.
Plugging these expression into the asset equation (11), we obtain the following growth rate of
innovations:
γA =
r − γY wµ
( η−1η )α
sw
− 1
¶³
1 + ψψN
´ (20)
This exercise yields some interesting observations. Note that I have not specified any production
function for R&D goods. As we have seen above, that is not necessary to calibrate the R&D
contribution to productivity growth. In particular, the following general form is perfectly consistent
with expression (20):
(ψ + ψN)
ψ A˙c = fc (Rc, {R−c} , Ac, {A−c}) ,
where c indexes country c, −c the sequence of other countries diﬀerent from c and the only restriction
on (the possibly country specific) function fc is that there are diminishing returns in Rc. Note that
this function captures all sorts of international spillovers in R&D.
Coming back to the calibration of the R&D contribution to productivity in the presence of
international spillovers, it is easy to see that the figures obtained cannot be larger than the ones
obtained in the previous section. Note from expression (20) that γA is increasing in sw and decreasing
in γYw . In the post-war period, the growth rate of output in the OECD has been higher than in
the US, and the share of R&D in GDP is higher in the US than in the OECD. Therefore I keep the
previous section’s results as upper bounds for the R&D contribution to productivity growth.
4.1.2 R&D lags
In reality there is a lag between the outlay of the R&D investment and the beginning of the
associated revenue stream. This lag corresponds both to the lag between project inception and
conception (the gestation lag), and the time from project completion to commercial application
(the application lag). Rapoport [1971] presents detailed data on the distribution of costs and
gestation time for forty-nine commercialized innovations and the total innovation time for a subset
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of sixteen of them in three product groups- chemicals, machinery, and electronics. The total lag
reported by Rapoport ranges from 1.2 to 2.4 years.
Wagner [1968] gathered survey data on the average R&D and application lags for process and
product oriented R&D from thirty-six firms with long R&D experience in a variety of durable and
nondurable goods industries. Unlike Rapaport’s data, Wagner’s takes into account expenditures on
both technically successful and unsuccessful projects. She reports an average total lag of 2.17 years
for nondurables and 2.62 for durables.
But, how does the inclusion of gestation lags aﬀects the previous analysis?
The free entry condition now reads:
e−rlPAt+l
ψN + ψ
ψN
A˙t+l = Rt,
where l is the gestation lag, t the time index and r the interest rate. From here
PAt+l =
st ψN
γAt+l(ψN + ψ) e−(r−gY )l
Yt+l
At+l
Then the resulting steady state growth rate of varieties is:
γA =
r − γYµ
( η−1η )αe−(r−gY )l
s
− 1
¶³
1 + ψψN
´
From the Rapoport and Wagner studies l ≤ 2.5, therefore e−(r−gY )l ≥ 0.914. This has a very
small eﬀect on the previous calculations.
4.1.3 Correlated shocks
In the baseline model we have assumed that the obsolescence shocks are independent across the
diﬀerent intermediate goods in a common innovation cluster. This is probably not a very realistic
assumption. When a new technological cluster is developed, there is a chance that it drives out of
the market a large number of intermediate goods of an older cluster. In this scenario, the shocks
faced by the intermediate goods in a given cluster are highly correlated. Next, I model this idea in
the simple case where each new technological cluster makes completely obsolete an older cluster.12,13
12This is precisely the structure of the simple quality ladder models.
13I could generalize this obsolescence structure by allowing a fraction of the new clusters to have only a gradual
eﬀect on the existing clusters while the rest completely substitute old clusters. The resulting R&D contribution on
productivity would then be somewhere between the values derived in section 3 and those obtained here.
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Let’s denote by V the value of a new cluster.14 The number of new clusters created every instant
is A˙ψN
, therefore the free entry condition reads:
e−rlV
A˙
ψN
= R
V satisfies the asset equation
rV = π(ψ + ψN) + V˙ −
# of new innovation clustersz}|{
A˙
ψN
1/# of existing clustersz }| {
ψ + ψN
A
V,
where the only diﬀerences with respect to the baseline case are that now an asset is composed of
(ψ + ψN ) innovations and therefore the profit flow must be multiplied by (ψ + ψN), and that the
probability of being driven out of the market is (ψ+ψN )ψ γA and in this event the value of the cluster
completely depreciates.
From these two equations it follows that
γA =
r − γY
( η−1η )αe−(r−gY )l
s
³
1 + ψψN
´
−
³
2 + ψψN
´ (21)
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Figure 7: Contribution of R&D under monopolistic pricing and correlated obsolescence.
14It is easy to check that, in this setting, V = (ψ + ψN)PA.
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Figure 8: Contribution of R&D under limit pricing and correlated obsolescence shocks.
From figures 7 and 8, we can see that even after introducing correlated shocks and R&D lags,
the contribution of R&D to productivity growth for the more reasonable markups is bounded above
by 3 to 5 tenths of one percentage point.
4.1.4 Subsequent R&D cost advantage
Up to now, a firm has been characterized by the set of varieties that form an innovation cluster. All
of these intermediate goods are developed simultaneously and once they become obsolete the firm
vanishes. However, the evidence tells us that a large fraction of innovations are developed by firms
that have already developed some other innovation clusters. This can be due to the fact that the
costs of innovation decline with the number of varieties developed.15 If this is the case, innovations
are more valuable than what we have computed so far. Investing in R&D not only grants the right
to the future revenues from the new innovation cluster but also the option to develop more clusters
in the future at a lower cost. To reconcile the higher value of innovations with the observed low s,
the free entry condition now dictates a lower growth rate of varieties and a smaller contribution of
R&D to productivity growth.
15Or alternatively, that the probability of being successful in the R&D investments increases with the firm’s
experience in R&D activities.
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This additional complexity is useful to generalize the argument made above to large firms. These
internalize part of the positive consequences of their investment decisions. By taking advantage of
part of the externalities, the value of the R&D firm increases, and the growth rate of varieties
induced by a given share of R&D is lower than when firms are small. Hence, the benchmark
contribution computed above gives an upper bound for the role of R&D in productivity growth
when firms are allowed to grow.
To show this more formally, let’s suppose that an incumbent firm j with i > 0 active innovation
clusters has the ability to develop up to i new innovation clusters every instant. Let’s rij denote the
amount of R&D this firm conducts for each of the i projects. Success at each of the projects arrives
with an independent Poisson rate δ(rij , {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1), where Ri and Ai denote respectively the
total R&D investments and the total number of varieties available in the market from the firms
with exactly i− 1 active clusters. The only restrictions I impose on δ are that it is increasing and
concave in rij . Let Ni−1 be the number of firms with exactly i − 1 active technological clusters.
The framework described so far implies that the total number of clusters developed every instant
by firms with already i− 1 ≥ 0 active technological clusters is
A˙i
ψN
= Ni−1 iδ(rij, {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1). (22)
One important modification introduced with this setup is that the firm now internalizes part
of the intertemporal consequences of its R&D investments because it is aware that succeeding in
developing the next technological cluster increases the chances of developing new clusters in the
future. However, for simplicity, I still assume that the number of firms in each size group (Ni)
is large and therefore that the eﬀects of rij on Ri, and of Aij on Ai are negligible.16 This means
that incumbents select rij to maximize i [δ(rij , {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1) (Vi+1 − Vi)− rij] taking as given
{Rc}∞c=1 and {Ac}∞c=1 .
The optimal level of rij (denoted by r
∗) does not depend directly on i, and satisfies the following
first order condition:
∂δ(r∗, {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1)
∂rij
(Vi+1 − Vi) = 1, for i > 0 (23)
16This seems to me the most reasonable scenario: one where firms internalize the cost advantage of subsequent
innovation but do not internalize the aggregate diminishing returns to R&D or the aggregate intertemporal exter-
nalities.
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From this framework, it follows that
1
Ri
A˙i
ψN
=
δ(r∗, {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1)
r∗
>
∂δ(r∗, {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1)
∂rij
=
1
Vi+1 − Vi
, for i > 0
where the first equality comes from the production function for R&D (22), the inequality is a
consequence of the concavity of δ on rij , and the second equality follows from the first order
condition (23). Rewriting this, we observe that incumbent R&D firms make positive profits on
average from successive innovations.
(Vi+1 − Vi)
A˙i
ψN
> Ri (24)
For new R&D firms, however, free entry brings down the expected value of a firm with exactly
one cluster to the cost of developing the first innovation cluster.
V1
A˙1
ψN
= R1 (25)
As before, we can derive the relationship between s and γA by pricing the R&D firms. The value
of a firm with exactly i ≥ 1 active clusters satisfies the following asset equation:
rVi = iπ(ψ + ψN ) + V˙i − i
A˙
ψN
(ψ + ψN)
A
(Vi − Vi−1) + imax
ri
δ(ri, {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1) (Vi+1 − Vi)− ri
Using the definition of r∗ and dividing by Vi, we obtain:
r = i
π
Vi
(ψ + ψN) +
V˙i
Vi
− i A˙ψN
(ψ + ψN )
A
µ
Vi − Vi−1
Vi
¶
+ iδ(r∗, {Rc}∞c=1 , {Ac}∞c=1)
µ
Vi+1 − Vi
Vi
¶
− ir
∗
Vi
At this point, we can make a very useful observation. If Vi = iV1, the RHS of this equation is
independent of i. This means that we can find a solution to this system of diﬀerence equations by
just solving the one for V1. Using this shortcut we can reduce the system to:
r =
π
V1
(ψ + ψN ) +
V˙1
V1
− A˙ψN
(ψ + ψN)
A
+
profit rate from subsequent R&Dz }| {
δ(r∗, {Ri}∞i=1 , {Ai}∞i=1)−
r∗
V1
(26)
The free entry condition for new innovators (25) implies that:
V1 =
s1ψN
A˙1
A1
A1
A
Y
A
,
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where s1 is the share of R&D conducted by entrants in total output. Since in the steady state γA1 ,
s1 and
A1
A
are constant, γV1 = γY − γA.
From (25) and (24) it follows that
∞X
i=1
(Vi − Vi−1)
A˙i
ψN
>
∞X
i=1
Ri
V1
A˙
ψN
> R
V1 >
sψN
γA
Y
A
, (27)
where the second inequality takes advantage of the fact that Vi = iV1.
Plugging (27) into the asset equation (26) we obtain the following inequality:
r >
³
η−1
η
´
α(ψ + ψN)
sψN
γA + γY − γA −
(ψ + ψN )
ψN
γA +
>0z }| {
δ(r∗, {Ri}∞i=1 , {Ai}∞i=1)−
r∗
V1
And from here,
γA <
r − γY −
>0z }| {µ
δ(r∗, {Ri}∞i=1 , {Ai}∞i=1)−
r∗
V1
¶
( η−1η )αe−(r−gY )l
s
³
1 + ψψN
´
−
³
2 + ψψN
´
To relate this expression with the growth rate of varieties when innovators are small (21), recall
that incumbents make positive profits from subsequent R&D. This means that the new term in the
numerator is strictly positive and that instead of an equality, now we have an strict inequality. As
a result, the γA implied by s when we allow firms to partially internalize the future cost advantages
of their current R&D (i.e. when they are large) is lower than when they are small.
4.2 Externalities in production
So far, I have shown the robustness of the claim that a small R&D intensity implies a small
growth rate of R&D-driven technology. In this section, I analyze the robustness of the small R&D
contribution to productivity growth. One possible route to show this is by arguing that the elasticity
of productivity growth with respect to γA is small. In the baseline model, this elasticity is equal to
1−αρ
ρ +
α(1−αρ)
ρ(1−α) , where the first term corresponds to the static externality of A on output and the
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second to the capital deepening driven by the development of new technologies. One might argue
that with a more general production function we could parameterize the externality in production
to explain an arbitrarily large growth rate of productivity just with R&D investments.
However, this is not the case because most of the R&D-driven innovations are embodied in
capital goods (Solow [1959]). This means that innovations with higher (social) value are more
demanded and their innovators enjoy larger profit rates. Therefore, the market value of the innova-
tions is correlated to their value for the producer of final output. In terms of my two-step approach,
this means that a large production externality raises the eﬀect of the growth of technology on pro-
ductivity growth but also reduces the growth of technology associated with a given R&D intensity.
As a result, the R&D contribution to productivity growth is not very sensitive to the size of the
externalities in production.
To see this more formally, consider an environment that is exactly the same as in the baseline
model but with the following aggregate production function:
Y = ZL1−α
·Z A
0
aix
αρ
i di
¸ 1
ρ
,
where now the level of R&D-driven technology is a continuous variable and the capital varieties
have diﬀerent eﬃciencies ai. To introduce some flexibility on the size of the production externality,
I set ai = bi
σ−1, where b is any positive constant that, without loss of generality, I normalize to 1,
σ > αρ and i is a technology index. When σ > 1, newer innovations are more eﬃcient than older
innovations. Note also that the size of the externality in production is increasing in σ. To see this,
suppose for a moment that the demand is the same for all the capital varieties, then the production
function could be rewritten as
Y = ZL1−αA
σ−αρ
ρ Kα,
where as before K ≡ Ax.17 If this was the resulting production function, the size of the production
externality would be σ−αρρ . Of course, this is not exact because the demand for each capital variety
(xi) varies with ai. In particular, the inverse demand for a particular variety i, is
pi = ZαL1−α
µZ A
0
aix
αρ
i di
¶ 1
ρ−1
aix
αρ−1
i .
17Admittedly, I restrict the analysis to Cobb-Douglas production functions. This however seems a good description
of the data. It is easy to show that within the class of constant elasticity of substitution production functions, any
other function yields a time varying labor share. That is inconsistent with the US evidence in the post-war period.
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Due to the isoelastic nature of the demand, innovators set a price equal to a constant markup η
times the marginal cost of production r. Doing some tedious algebra, we can easily find that when
the state of the art technology has index A, the level of output is given by expression (28) and the
profits for an innovator that developed a variety with index i ≤ A are given by (29).18
Y = LZ
1
1−αα
α
1−α (ηr)
−α
1−α A
σ−αρ
ρ(1−α) (28)
πiA =
η − 1
η α
σ − αρ
1− αρ| {z }
Level eﬀect
Y
A
µ
A
i
¶ σ−1
1−αρ
| {z }
Gradual substitution
(29)
In this last expression, we can appreciate two eﬀects of σ on the profits of an innovator. The
higher curvature in the eﬃciency of capital vintages (σ), the higher the initial level of profits, but
also the faster final good producers gradually substitute towards the new, more eﬃcient, varieties.
Expression (29) can be rewritten in terms of the vintage of the capital variety sold by the
innovator. More specifically, let vi be the vintage of the capital good with index i. In steady state,
A grows at the constant rate γA.Without loosing much perspective, let’s suppose that the economy
started in the balanced growth path. Then the profits at time t of an innovator that developed a
vintage vi capital good are:
πvit =
η − 1
η α
Y
A
σ − αρ
1− αρ e
−( σ−11−αρ)(t−vi)γA. (30)
When σ > 1, the innovations embodied in newer capital varieties are more profitable than those
embodied in older vintages. The converse is true when σ < 1. Consequently, the market value of
an innovation generically varies in the cross-section. Let PAt,v denote the price at time t of an
innovation embodied in a vintage v capital good. From free entry, we know that
PAtt =
sψN
γA (ψN + ψ)
Y
A
. (31)
Since PAtv is determined in the market, it satisfies the following diﬀerential equation:
rPAtv = πvt + P˙Atv −
ψ
ψN
γA (32)
18It can also be shown that
K =
Z A
0
aixidi = χKZ
1
1−αLA
(σ−αρ)(1−ρ)+ρ(1−α)(2σ−1−σαρ)
ρ(1−α)(1−αρ) ,
where χK is a positive constant; and that
Y = χY ZAσ˜KαL1−α,
where χY is another positive constant and σ˜ =
σ(1−αρ)
ρ .
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It is easy to see that PAtv = PAtt e
−γA( σ−11−αρ)(t−v).19 This implies that γPAtv = γY − γA
³
σ−αρ
1−αρ
´
.
Dividing both sides of equation (32) by PAvt and plugging (30) and this expression for γPAtv , we
can derive expression (33).
γA =
r − γYµ
(η−1η )α
s
³
1 + ψψN
´
− 1
¶³
σ−αρ
1−αρ
´
− ψψN
(33)
This expression diﬀers from the growth rate of technology in the baseline model (13) in two
respects. First, the profit rate of innovations increases with σ. Second, a higher σ implies a higher
expected capital loss due to the depreciation of the market value of the innovations. The first eﬀect
raises the current value of an innovation while the second reduces it. However, in expression (33)
it is clear that the first force dominates the second, and the higher is the externality in production
(σ) the lower is the growth rate of technology associated with a given R&D intensity.
To complete the calculation we just have to derive the growth rate of productivity from expres-
sion (28).
γY/L =
1
1− αγZ +
σ − αρ
ρ (1− α)γA
Note that, for a given γA, the R&D contribution to productivity growth is increasing in σ. However,
doing some simple algebra we can check that, after taking into account the eﬀect of σ on γA, the
R&D contribution to productivity growth is decreasing in σ. To assess the quantitative importance
of these eﬀects, I plot the R&D contribution for several values of σ and ψ/ψN when the markup is
equal to 1.2, figure 9, and 1.3, figure 10. For simplicity I restrict myself to the case of monopolistic
markups (i.e. η = (αρ)−1).
19For this you can solve the diﬀerential equation (32) plugging in (30) and using the initial condition (31).
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Figure 9: R&D contribution to productivity growth with η = 1.2 for several σ0s
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
x 10-3
Psi/PsiN
sigma=0.9 
sigma=0.95 
sigma=1 
sigma=1.2 
Figure 10: R&D contribution to productivity growth with η = 1.3, and several σ0s.
From these figures, we can see that the small R&D contribution to productivity growth is quite
robust to the size of the production externality.
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4.3 Transition and relation to Jones [2001]
Jones [2001] has argued that the US economy has been in a transition to the steady state during
the post-war period. In this section I extend the previous analysis to the transition and relate my
findings to Jones [2001].
When deriving the relationship between s and γA, I have only assumed that the economy is
in steady state to compute the price appreciation of the innovations. Remember that free entry
implies that
PA =
sψN
γA (ψN + ψ)
Y
A
.
If the economy is in the transition, then
γPA =
Steady Statez }| {
γY − γA +
Transitionz }| {
γs − γγA.
The asset pricing equation holds at every instant, but now we have to recognize the new expression
for the price appreciation of an innovation. This yields the following diﬀerential equation for γA:
d (ln(γA))
dt
−
·
η − 1
η
α (ψN + ψ)
sψN
−
µ
1 +
ψ
ψN
¶¸
γA = − (r − γY − γs) (34)
Since s is time varying this diﬀerential equation does not have a close form solution. To approximate
the average growth rate of A, we can solve this diﬀerential equation calibrating s to the average
R&D intensity during the transition. Then the solution to this equation takes the form
γA(t) =
·
C1e
R t
0 (r(v)−γY (v)−γs(v)) dv −
·
η − 1
η
α (ψN + ψ)
sψN
−
µ
1 +
ψ
ψN
¶¸Z t
0
e
R t
v (r(τ)−γY (τ)−γs(τ)) dτdτ
¸−1
For illustrative purposes, suppose that the term (r(v)− γY (v)− γs(v)) is constant. Then this
expression is equal to
γA(t) =

C˜e(r−γY −γs) t +
h
η−1
η
α(ψN+ψ)
sψN
−
³
1 + ψψN
´i
(r − γY − γs)


−1
In the long run (r − γY − γs) > 0, therefore for a steady state to exist, it is necessary that
C˜ = 0. This implies that
γA =
r − γY − γsh
η−1
η
α(ψN+ψ)
sψN
−
³
1 + ψψN
´i . (35)
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In figure 1, we can appreciate an upward trend in s for the post-war period. This positive growth in
s, yields a lower γA in expression (35) than if it had remained constant.20 Intuitively, a (temporary)
upward trend in the share of resources devoted to R&D is due to an expected appreciation in the
value of innovations. Therefore the current market price of innovations is higher and, from free
entry, the associated growth rate of R&D driven-technology must be lower.
4.3.1 Relationship to Jones [2001]
In a recent paper, Jones [2001] also analyzes the sources of growth in the US post-war experience
and concludes that most of the growth in TFP can be accounted for by R&D. Interestingly, the
basic models underlying Jones’s and my analysis are the same. The diﬀerence in our conclusions
resides in the diﬀerent approaches followed in the quantitative analysis of the model. Instead of
exploiting the free entry condition, Jones [2001] poses a production function for new technologies
that he estimates to figure out how much growth can be attributed to R&D. In particular, he
considers the specification reproduced in equation (36) where HA is the number of workers in the
R&D sector, and both λ and φ are smaller than 1.
A˙
A
= δˆHλAAφ−1. (36)
Y = AσKαL1−α (37)
Expression (36) coupled with the Cobb-Douglas production function for final output presented
in expression (37) imply an average contribution of R&D to TFP growth that is approximately
equal to ϑγHA, where ϑ =
σ
1−α
λ
1−φ . It is transparent in this expression that Jones’s conclusions
follow from the specification used for the R&D technology and from the calibration of ϑ. Jones
calibrates ϑ by estimating a log-linear approximation of (36) where A is imperfectly measured by
the total factor productivity (B) as shown in equation (38).
logBt = logAt + ²t (38)
20From expression (15), it follows that, when we take into account the transition of the US during the post-war
period, the resulting R&D contribution to productivity growth is also lower than if we assume that the US economy
was in steady state.
31
More specifically, Jones estimates the following equation
∆ logBt+1 = β0 + λγB
·
logHAt −
1
ϑ logBt
¸
+ εt+1, (39)
where εt+1 ≡ 4²t+1 + λγBϑ ²t is a serially correlated error term.
As Jones points out, the estimation of equation (39) creates as many diﬃculties as the regressions
in the productivity literature. In particular, the estimate of 1ϑ is likely to be biased for at least
two reasons. First, business cycle fluctuations in R&D expenditures imply that the regressor is
endogenous. Second, the measurement error in A (and the potential misspecification of the R&D
production equation) also generate a correlation between the error term (εt+1) and the regressor
(logBt). However, Jones appeals to the possible cointegration between logHAt and logBt which
imply that the OLS estimate of 1ϑ is super consistent (Hamilton [1994]).
An important practical issue is whether this asymptotic result can be invoked in a finite sample
application like Jones’s. Campbell and Perron [1991] study this question using Monte Carlo analysis
and conclude that a useful rule of thumb is that asymptotic results can be exploited in samples of
the size encountered in empirical applications when we can reject the null of no cointegration using
the asymptotic critical values.
Table 2 presents results of an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals of the following
regression:21
logHAt = α0 + α1 logBt + ut
Table 2: Cointegration regression
Dependent Variable uˆt
βˆ0
0.0031
(0.0089)
ρˆ
0.804
(0.085)
R2 0.66
N 43
Dickey-Fuller t-statistic: (ρˆ− 1) /σˆρˆ -2.3
21I have experimented also with several lag structures in the first diﬀerences of the residuals but these were never
significant. Even when including them, the results of the test were the same.
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Source: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/chad/Sources50.asc
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
The critical value for this statistic at the 5 percent significance level is -3.42, which is lower
than the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic. Therefore we cannot reject the null that there is no cointegration
between logHAt and logBt. While this statistical tests does not altogether rule out the possibility
that logHAt and logBt share a common trend, they do suggest that it may be diﬃcult to exploit
the asymptotic properties of cointegration systems in samples of the size we currently have in order
to calibrate ϑ, and that exploring alternative approaches may be useful. This paper has presented
one such alternative which implies a value of ϑ around 0.05. This value is the lower bound used by
Jones [2001] in his analysis.
5 Welfare
So far I have conducted a positive analysis of the contribution of R&D to productivity growth.
However, the previous findings can be used to conduct a normative analysis. In particular, we can
proceed in the following three steps. First, specify a production function for innovations; second, use
the computed growth rate of R&D-driven technology (γA) to quantify the size of the externalities
in the production of new technologies. Finally, solve the social planner’s problem and determine
the socially optimal R&D intensity (s∗).
Note that in contrast to the positive analysis, now it is necessary to specify a production function
for new technologies, therefore our results will depend on the particular functional form specified.
In this sense, this section just intends to compare our approach to previous ones. To this end, we
adopt the R&D technology used by Jones and Williams [2000] which generalizes the innovation
technology posed in Stokey [1995]. Specifically, they assume that
A˙t = δ
1
1 + ψ/ψN
RλtA
φ
t , (40)
where both λ and φ are bounded above by 1. In steady state,γA is constant, therefore
γA
γY
=
λ
1− φ . (41)
Expression (41) relates the size of the R&D externalities to the actual growth rate of the US
economy and to the growth rate of R&D-driven technology that I have already quantified in section
4.2.
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Following Jones and Williams [2000], I consider a production function for final output that
displays static externalities. As in section 4.2, I relate the size of this externality to the elasticity of
substitution across diﬀerent varieties and to the importance of embodied productivity growth. In
particular, output is produced according to expression (42).
Yt = A
σ˜
t ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t (42)
From section 4.2, we know that, in this context, the growth rate of R&D technology (γA) is
given by expression (43) where σ = ρσ˜/ (1− αρ) .
γA =
r − γYµ
(η−1η )α
s
³
1 + ψψN
´
− 1
¶³
σ−αρ
1−αρ
´
− ψψN
(43)
Expressions (41) and (43) define a relationship between λ and φ for given (η, α, s, r, γY , ψ/ψN ,
ρ, σ), where these parameters can be calibrated in the decentralized economy. Table 3 summarizes
this calibration.
Table 3: Parameters
r 0.07
γY 0.034
α 0.33
s 0.02
ψ/ψN 0.25
ρ 1/(ηα)
σ {0.9, 0.95, 1, 1.05}
η 1.2
There are a few remarks worthwhile making about this calibration. First, note that the markup
η is calibrated conservatively, and that I impose monopolistic pricing of the innovations in order to
calibrate the elasticity of substitution across diﬀerent varieties. Finally, note that in each techno-
logical cluster there are four times as many completely new goods as new versions of old goods.
Figure 11 plots the size of the R&D externality (φ) associated with various levels of the static
externality (σ) and with the size of the stepping on the toes eﬀect (1−λ). This relationship is quite
34
robust to the variation of the rest of the parameters and in this benchmark I have chosen values of
η, ρ, ψ/ψN and θ that yield a higher schedule for φ.
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Figure 11: φ(1− λ)
Now that we have bounded the R&D technology using actual US data, we can solve the Social
planner’s problem to determine the optimal R&D intensity (s∗).
Her problem can be formalized as follows:
max
{ct,Rt}
Z ∞
0
c1−θt − 1
1− θ e
−ςtdt
subject to:
ctLt + It +Rt = Yt = A
σ˜
t ZtK
α
t L
1−α
t
K˙t = It,K0 > 0
A˙t = δ
1
1 + ψ/ψN
RλtA
φ
t , A0 > 0
Z˙
Z
= γZ ; Z0 > 0
L˙
L
= n; L0 > 0
After setting up the Hamiltonian and deriving the first order conditions it is easy to see that in
steady state, the social planner devotes a share of output s∗ to R&D investments, and this results
in a growth rate γ∗A of R&D-driven technology, where the expressions for these two variables are as
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follows:
s∗ = σ˜λ
·
(1− φ)
λ [θ + φ− 1] +
ς − n (θ − 1)
γ∗A
¸−1
γ∗A =
(1− α)
1−φ
λ (1− α)− σ˜
·
n+
γZ
1− α
¸
To compute s∗ I just have to calibrate some parameters that I have not quantified yet. These
are γZ , ς, θ. In this model, Z is exogenous. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that γZ is the same
in the decentralized and in the planned economy. The production function implies that in steady
state, γZ = (1− α) (γY − n)− σ˜γA.
ς and θ determine the consumer preferences. The optimal consumption path for the represen-
tative consumer in the decentralized economy must satisfy the following Euler equation.
γc =
1
θ [r − n− ς] (Euler Equation)
The growth rate of the labor force in the US in the post-war period (n) has been equal to 0.0144
and the growth rate of consumption per capita (γc) has been 0.021. Therefore if we calibrate the
discount rate (ς) to 0.04, the Euler equation implies an inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (θ) between 1 and 2.
Figure 12 plots the resulting optimal R&D intensities for several values of σ and for the λ0s
that yield a φ in the interval [0,1]. The most striking fact from this figure is that the optimal
R&D intensities are not much higher than the actual ones. This finding is robust to alternative
parameterizations of θ, ς, σ, and of the parameters that determine γA.
Kortum [1993] has estimated λ to be between 0.1 and 0.6. Interestingly, for this range of λ, the
actual R&D intensity roughly coincides with the intensity that the social planner prescribes.
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Figure 12: s∗(1− λ)
This conclusion contrasts with Jones and Williams [2000] who find that “the decentralized
economy typically underinvests in R&D relative to what is socially optimal”. The reason for the
divergence in our findings is that we pursue diﬀerent strategies to quantify γA. While Jones and
Williams assume that all TFP growth can be explained by R&D-driven investments, this paper
allows the free entry condition to determine the magnitude of γA.
6 Where does this leave us?
Productivity increases because we learn how to use our factors more eﬃciently. This learning may
be a by-product of other activities not directed at increasing the productivity of resources or the
result of investment eﬀorts directed towards the improvement of productivity. In this paper I have
shown that one of these investments, R&D, is not responsible for a large share of productivity
growth in the US. Since the US is the world leader in R&D, this conclusion can be made extensive
to the other nations.
Our prior was that R&D is the main source of long run growth. The immediate question that
emerges from this analysis is “then, what is the driving force of productivity growth?”. This question
should be placed at the top of the research agenda.
From a normative perspective, this analysis implies that the decentralized economy may not be
underinvesting in R&D.
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